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A spectre has haunted the west: did socialism discipline income 
inequality? 
André Albuquerque Sant’Anna* 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role of the existence of a powerful socialist bloc 
as a disciplining device to inequality in western countries. The recent literature on top 
income inequality has emphasized explanations that go beyond the marginal 
productivity framework to explain top incomes. Usually the literature points to domestic 
factors such as top income tax rates and bargaining power. Some authors also assign a 
role for external factors such as the two World Wars that played in destroying capital, 
whether physical or financial, through inflation. Nevertheless, this literature does not 
embody the contributions of the state capacity literature that recognizes external 
conflicts as a source for the development of institutions that increase state capacity. In 
this paper, we analyze the role of a latent conflict that has occurred from WWII to the 
eighties: the Cold War. We believe this lasting conflict helped to shape the creation of 
common-interest states, as Besley and Persson (2013) defined. Under these common-
interest states, a social cohesion emerged because of the presence of a powerful external 
enemy, leading to reduced top income shares. In order to test our hypothesis, we run a 
panel of 18 OECD countries between 1960-2010. We find a robust and negative 
significant relation between Soviet Union’s relative military power and top income 
shares. 
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I- Introduction 
Recently, inequality has occupied not only Wall Street but has also regained importance 
as an object of study for many economists. According to Stiglitz (2014, p. 6), in 
opposition to a famous position held by Lucas, “…of the tendencies that have marked 
modern macroeconomics, the most seductive and poisonous is the failure to pay due 
attention to inequality”. 
As a matter of fact, inequality has increased in most developed countries, and especially 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, since the eighties. In the USA, for example, the share of the 
top percentile was 9.1% in 1986. In 2012, this share amounted to 19.3%. Although less 
pronounced, this trend was general among developed countries1. As a result, as shown 
by Piketty (2014), inequality has resumed to levels comparable to the beginning of the 
XXth century. 
Some authors explain the recent surge in inequality as a result of technological 
innovation and globalization. According to this view, skill-biased technical change has 
led to a shift of demand to skilled workers, who became a complement factor to capital. 
On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled workers and capital 
would have increased. In a context of free mobility of capital, this led to a 
rearrangement of low-skilled labor industries to less developed countries. As a result, as 
shown by Timmer et al (2014), the share of capital and high-skilled labor increased in 
developed countries, with a declining share for low-skilled workers2. On the other hand, 
there are those that argue for an important role of institutions. Piketty et al (2014) argue 
that differences in developed countries, especially continental Europe and Anglo-
Saxons, cannot be explained solely by technology: there must be a role for institutional 
factors, therefore. Hence, the authors explore the role of tax policy, especially top 
marginal rates, to explain the trend in inequality and the differences among countries. 
Piketty (2014) highlights an important point that relates to institutional factors: the 
distributive process is subject to many forces that shape it and political forces are 
especially important in that sense3. In addition, Atkinson et al (2011) and Piketty (2014) 
draw attention to two very idiosyncratic shocks that affect the trajectories of wealth and 
                                                          
1
 In Sweden, for example, the top percentile share increased from 4.1% to 7.1% in the same period. 
2
 On the role of directed technical change and productivity mismatches, see Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001) 
and Acemoglu (2002). 
3
 Acemoglu & Robinson (2005) remark the role of political power in shaping the distribution of economic 
resources. 
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income distributions, especially, in advanced countries. The two World Wars played a 
role as massive destroyers of capital, whether physical or financial. In order to finance 
the wars and to repay its national debts, governments achieved a consensus to increase 
tax rates. In this sense, those authors’ view is consistent with Besley and Persson 
(2011), who propose external conflicts, in building a social consensus, have a role in the 
development of state capacity, that relies heavily on the fiscal capacity.  
This paper argues that these explanations for the dynamics of top income inequality 
miss a single and important event: the emergence of a powerful communist bloc. After 
WWII, Soviet Union became a military superpower rivaling with United States. This 
gave birth to a period without precedent of shared hegemony and strategic rivalry 
during almost forty years, leading to Cold War. Given that context, western countries 
had to build what Besley and Persson (2013, p.42) call a common-interest state: “the 
nearest real-world example [for a common-interest state] might be what happens in a 
state of war, or a common external threat where common interests are paramount”.  
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the role of the existence of a powerful 
socialist country as a disciplining device to inequality in western countries. This is what 
we call the “spectre has haunted the west effect”. Hence this paper is organized in seven 
sections, including this introduction. In section II, we review briefly the related 
literature and develop in detail our argument. In section III, we describe our data, its 
sources and discuss some evidence based on descriptive statistics. Section IV proposes 
an empirical model and discusses issues related to endogeneity problems and propose 
the utilization of an instrumental variable. In section V, main results are presented and 
discussed. Section VI presents some robustness tests. Finally, in section VII, we present 
our main conclusions. 
II – Conceptual discussion and literature 
The surge in inequality has been drawing attention for at least fifteen years. Initially, 
most of the discussion was related to technology, globalization and its effects on labor 
market (Katz and Autor, 1999). Alvaredo et al (2013), on the other hand, propose an 
institutional explanation that goes beyond the market view. The authors propose four 
mechanisms to explain the increase in inequality and its differences among countries: (i) 
tax policy; (ii) labor market; (iii) capital income and (iv) joint distribution of capital and 
labor income.  
4 
 
According to Alvaredo et al (2013), changes in tax rates engender behavioral change 
among top earners. On labor market, the authors argue that, in order to understand its 
relation with inequality, one has to use a richer model of pay determination, where 
bargaining plays a decisive role. Piketty et al (2014) treat these points in a theoretical 
and empirical model. They show that tax rates affect behavior in three distinct ways that 
lead to three different elasticities. The first is the traditional effort elasticity, where a 
higher marginal tax reduces incentives to hard working. The second elasticity relates to 
avoidance efforts. When marginal taxes are high, there is an increased incentive for 
individuals to search other forms of income (e.g., dividends, stock options etc.). Finally, 
with higher taxes, top earners have reduced incentives to bargain for additional income. 
Since there is a cost in bargaining, “When top marginal tax rates were very high, the net 
reward to a highly paid executive for bargaining for more compensation was modest” 
Alvaredo et al (2013, p. 10). 
Alvaredo et al (2013) also consider the effects of joint distribution of earned and capital 
income. As the authors notice, there is a strong and increasing association between 
them. They conjecture that better paid top executives are more able to accumulate and, 
on the other hand, the effects of networking may lead born-rich individuals to high-
paying employment4.   
Lastly, according to Alvaredo et al (2013, p.12), “The decline of top capital incomes is 
the main driver of the falls in top income shares that occurred in many countries early in 
twentieth century”. Piketty (2011) documents an increasing role of inheritance flows as 
a fraction of disposable income since the 1950’s, when this relation has achieved its 
minimum. It is now almost as high as in the beginning of the XXth century, before 
WWI. This is an important point for Piketty (2014)’s arguments since he emphasizes 
the role of capital destruction during the two world wars in order to explain the decline 
in top income shares during the post WWII period. In that sense, Atkinson et al (2011) 
point to two forces. The first, as aforementioned, was the loss of capital income that 
arose due to physical capital destruction and financial capital losses related to high 
inflation and direct redistribution through confiscation. The second mechanism is 
related to a unique period of equalization of earned incomes, called “the Great 
Compression” by Goldin and Margo (1992). 
                                                          
4
 There is a growing literature on social networks and inequality. See, e.g., DiMaggio and Garip (2011).  
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As the empirical construction of top income shares for long time series is very recent, so 
it is the literature that tries to explain the dynamics of inequality in the long term. 
Piketty et al (2014) emphasize the role of tax marginal rates to explain top income 
shares. Roine et al (2009) look at several variables. They too find an important role for 
marginal taxes, but also a positive role for financial development and GDP growth in 
increasing proportionally more top incomes. However, these results, especially the 
marginal tax effects, may suffer from omitted variable bias: it is possible that a common 
variable reduces political power from the elites, leading to an increase in marginal taxes 
and a decrease in top income shares5.  
An explanation for that may come from the state capacity literature (Besley and 
Persson, 2009). According to the authors, “Historians see the evolution of state capacity 
– especially the capacity to raise taxes – as a central fact to be explained (…) [and] state 
capacity evolved historically over centuries in response to exigencies of war. War 
placed a premium on sources of taxation” (Besley and Persson, 2009, p.1).  Indeed, 
there is some evidence that states increased their capacity to raise taxes and, 
predominantly income and wealth taxes, in periods of war (Besley and Persson, 2009). 
Scheve and Stasavage (2012) document how inheritance taxes are related to war in a 
panel of countries. Aghion et al (2012) investigate the relation between investments in 
primary education and military rivalry.  
Although Atkinson et al (2011) recognize a role for changes in political regimes and 
partisanship, they fail to account for a major event that gained momentum after WWII: 
the emergence of Soviet Union as a global military power. Hence, although after WWII 
there have been some important wars, the most important military rivalry was between 
capitalist and socialist countries, that led to Cold War.  
This paper’s contribution is to introduce the effects of an external threat, linked to 
Soviet Union’s rise as a global military power, to understand the dynamics of top 
income shares in advanced western countries throughout the second half of XXth 
century. In doing so, this paper adds to the recent empirical literature on the dynamics 
of inequality by introducing a state capacity argument: the constant menace related to 
military rivalry with the communist bloc has been an important factor to drive western 
                                                          
5
 Piketty et al (2014) are aware of that and propose a different (micro) approach to deal with that, by 
looking at CEO behaviors when tax change in a panel of countries. They find similar results with macro 
and micro approaches.  
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states to build a social consensus, with reduced inequality and a major participation of 
top earners on the building of fiscal capacity. On the other hand, it also adds empirically 
to the public good argument of state capacity theory and highlights a less discussed 
point: there need be no war for a state capacity to be built: the mere presence of a 
spectre haunting is sufficient for it to happen6. 
III – Data and descriptive statistics 
Our analysis is based on a panel data with 18 developed countries covering the period 
from 1960 to 20107. As some control variables are available only from 1970, some 
model specifications cover the period 1970-2010. 
III.1 – Top income shares 
As in Piketty et al (2014), we use data on the income shares of the top 1 percent from 18 
OECD countries. The data was collected in the authors’ dataset appendix.  Although the 
original data comes from the World Top Incomes Database and has a larger period span, 
data on top tax rates is only available for these countries since 1960.  
III.2 –Military power in relation to USSR/Russia 
The database Correlates of War provides historical data on military expenditures8.  We 
use the ratio of military expenditures of Soviet Union/Russia and country i, normalized 
by distance between Moscow and country’s capital. That is:  
		
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		 
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	
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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. 
This variable aims to capture the evolution of relative military power and the effect of 
distance from USSR/Russia. In that sense, for the same ratio of military expenditures, a 
country like Finland would have a lower relative power than Spain, for example. As 
robustness check, we also use an alternative measure of military strength based on the 
relative Composite Index of National Capabilities9. 
III.3 – Control variables 
                                                          
6
 Aghion et al (2012) recognize this point and work with Thompson (2001)’s definition of strategic 
rivalry.  
7
 Table A.1 shows the list of countries in the sample. 
8
 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Singer et al (1972) created this database on National Material 
Capabilities. 
9
 There is also a Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). This is a measure that summarizes 
observations on each of the 6 capability indicators, which are: military personnel, military expenditures, 
total population, urban population, iron and steel consumption and primary energy consumption. 
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Besides the variables of interest, we use covariates in order to control for other 
important factors affecting top inequality. As Besley and Persson (2009), we do not 
include income, income per capita among the independent variables. The reason for that 
relies on the endogeneity of development and state capacity. Thus, we prefer to rely on 
an independent builder of state capacity to understand its effects on inequality. 
III.3.1 - Top marginal taxes 
The theoretical and empirical literature reinforces the importance of top marginal taxes 
to explain top income shares. In this paper, we use top marginal taxes provided by 
Piketty et al (2014)10, who gather information from several sources. 
III.3.2 – Union density 
Alvaredo et al (2013) remark the importance of bargaining in the labor market, where 
marginal productivity cannot be observed, as a possible factor in the explanation of top 
incomes dynamics. Piketty et al (2014) explore this point in a theoretical and empirical 
model, with a focus on CEO’s compensation as the result of a bargain game with 
shareholders. Nevertheless, one should not forget the other side of the coin: there is also 
a bargaining game between workers and executives (and shareholders) in order to 
decide wages. Given that, we gather information on the OECD Trade Union Dataset 
from 1960 to 2012.  
III.3.4 – Financial Openness 
An important part of the literature (Atkinson et al, 2011, for example) draws attention 
on the effects of global forces, especially globalization. Roine et al (2009) investigate it 
through the trade openness of a country. Nevertheless, a significant trace of 
globalization is that it is financial size expands much faster than trade. Therefore, we 
use external financial assets plus external financial liabilities as a share of GDP in order 
to measure a country’s financial global insertion (IMF, 2013). Data from external 
financial assets and liabilities is taken from the External Wealth of Nations Mark II 
database and starts its coverage in 1970 (Lane and Milesi-Ferreti, 2007). 
III.3.4 – War risk 
The empirical literature on state capacity emphasizes the role of a country being 
engaged in a war as a measure that drives the building of state capacity. We use the 
                                                          
10
 Here, we use only federal income taxes instead of a compounded income tax, as Piketty et al (2014).  
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same variable as defined by Aghion et al (2012, p.16): “war risk is a binary indicator set 
equal to one if the country was engaged in an interstate war in the previous 10 years, 
according to the variable ‘inter-state war’ in the Correlates of War (COW) database”. 
Additionally, we use another variable in some specifications. War effort is also created 
from the COW database: it is the product of the variable Militarized interstate dispute 
with the share of military personnel on the total population11.  
III.4 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used to test our hypothesis.  From 
table 1, it is not possible to have a first inference on any relation between the dependent 
variable and independent variables.  
Table 1 – descriptive statistics 
Variable         Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Top Income Share 774 0.081 0.025 0.035 0.183 
Top Income Tax Rate 919 0.560 0.135 0.280 0.963 
Financial Openness 739 2.439 3.407 0.179 33.062 
Union Density 871 0.391 0.194 0.075 0.839 
War risk 864 0.186 0.390 - 1.000 
War effort 864 0.014 0.038 - 0.355 
Relative Milit. Expend. 
(USSR/country) 864 116 235 0 1,747 
Distance from capital to Moscow 864 4,608 4,388 893 16,565 
 
Nevertheless, when one takes into account the relation between the logarithm of Rel 
Power and the log of top income share, as shown in Figure 1, it appears to have a strong 
negative relation between the variables. 
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 Scheve and Stasavage (2012) use a similar variable to define their war mobilization variable. 
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Figure 1 
 
Hence, we present, in table 2, mean values for the variables from 1960 to 1991 in 
column 1 and from 1992 to 2010 in column 2. 
Table 2 – mean values for two distinct periods 
Mean (1960-1991) Mean (1992-2010) 
Top Income Share 0.074 0.091 
Top Income Tax Rate 0.618 0.462 
Financial Openness 1.057 4.018 
Union Density 0.424 0.340 
War risk 0.109 0.340 
War effort 0.017 0.009 
Relative Milit. Expend. 
(USSR/country) 166.126 15.598 
Distance from capital to Moscow 4,608 4,608 
 
From table 2, it is clear that top incomes had a higher share during 1992-2010 as 
compared to 1960-1991. There was also a sharp increase in financial openness in this 
period, as a result of the deepening of globalization. The variable associated to war risk 
also presented a higher mean in the second period. This might be driven by the presence 
of too many European countries in the sample and their presence in Kosovo conflict 
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during the nineties. Nevertheless, when we look to war effort, the difference is small, 
but the mean is higher in the 1960-1991 period. 
More importantly, relative military expenditures were much higher in the period of 
USSR existence.  Also, top income tax rates were higher, as already documented by 
Piketty et al (2014), and union density decreased from 1960-1991 to 1992-2010, 
reflecting the loss of bargaining power of workers. 
IV – Empirical model  
As argued in section II, the relation between top income share and top marginal tax rates 
might be driven by omitted variable bias. More importantly, we propose that the relative 
military and economic strength of Soviet Union has been an important factor to explain 
the maintenance of a stable and smaller share of top incomes during four decades after 
WWII. Thus, the empirical strategy follows a fixed-effects model based on a panel of 
annual data at the country level. Benchmark specification is defined by equation (1).  
#$%&	
  '		
 ( ')*	
 ( '+, ( -	 ( .	
     (1) 
Where #$%&	
 is the top percentile income share for each country at year t. The 
first term in the right-hand side is the measure of relative power, Rel powerit, described 
in the previous section. This variable aims to capture the evolution of relative military 
power and the effect of distance to Moscow. Xit is a vector of control variables, 
containing country-level information according to the discussion in section II, t is a time 
trend and µ is the country fixed-effect and ε is the model error term12.  
The model relies on the identification strategy hypothesis that Rel power is not related 
to the error term. However, it is possible that elites are especially connected to the 
defense industry. Therefore, an increase in top income shares could lead to higher 
political power to elites and an enforced lobby to military spending if elites are 
especially tied to defense industry. Although we don’t believe this is valid for the 
majority of countries, it might be true for countries like United Kingdon, France, 
Sweden and, overall, United States. In order to overcome this possible endogeneity bias, 
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 As Piketty et al (2014), we use time trends instead of time fixed effects because we focus on long-run 
effects and not on year-to-year variation. 
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we use Rel powerjt as an instrument for Rel powerit, where j is for country’s i closest 
neighbor13.  
V – Results 
Table 1 presents results with the TSLS estimations, using  Rel powerjt of the countries’ 
neighborhood as an instrumental variable14. All variables, with exception of war risk 
that is binary, are in natural logarithm.  
Table 1: TSLS estimations - Panel A: Second stage estimation 
Dep. Variable: top 
1% share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rel power -0.145 
(0.011)*** 
-0.133 
(0.010)*** 
-0.083 
(0.011)*** 
-0.083 
(0.012)*** 
Top tax -0.682 
(0.042)*** 
-0.622 
(0.042)*** 
-0.543 
(0.046)*** 
-0.540 
(0.047)*** 
Union  -0.219 
(0.028)*** 
-0.169 
(0.032)*** 
-0.171 
(0.032)*** 
Financial op   0.179 
(0.024)*** 
0.179 
(0.024)*** 
War risk    -0.009 
(0.021) 
Obs 706 694 584 584 
Period range 1960-2010 1960-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
R2 0.48 0.52 0.65 0.65 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All specifications include country fixed effects, a constant and a time trend. Standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
From table 1, all variables have expected sign. As argued in the conceptual section, the 
relative geopolitical power of USSR has had a negative effect on inequality in the West, 
apparently confirming the “spectre has haunted effect”. This result holds even when 
controlling for a number of variables as Union and War risk. After all, the effect could 
be driven, in fact, by an increase in war conflicts during the period of Cold War, for 
example. This would be captured by War risk, as the literature on state capacity usually 
emphasizes (Aghion et al, 2012). On the other hand, while the west gained relative 
power, there has, at more or less the same period, a substantial decrease in trade union 
density, resulting in a loss of bargaining power of workers. If the communist menace 
arrived only by workers’ organization, the coefficient on Rel powerit would be zero 
when controlling for Union. 
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 A similar approach is used by Aghion et al (2012). The authors use rivalries with third countries of 
those countries with which a certain country shares a border.  
14Table A.2 shows the first stage results. As can be seen our instrument is strong. 
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The effect of top marginal tax rates remains negative and significant in all 
specifications. In fact, its economic significance is remarkable: there is an implied 
elasticity of 0.515. As discussed before, the bargaining power of workers implied by 
strong unions also has a negative effect on top income shares.  
Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect of financial openness is similar to trade 
union’s but with the opposite signal. Financial openness is a proxy for the forces at 
work with globalization. Firstly, it is related to the possibility of tax avoidance that 
increases substantially with free mobility of capital and the emergence of tax havens16. 
Financial openness is also related to capital flows related to international fragmentation 
of production (Lipsey, 2010). The only variable that does not present statistical 
significance is War risk.  
In table 2, we account for the fact that part of the Rel powerit effect varies whether a 
country has engaged in war. In order to do that, we created two interactions: Rel 
power*War_risk and Rel power*War_effort. According to the definition of variables in 
section III, War effort is used as an alternative to War Risk in some specifications, 
because it adds more variability to the desired measure of threaten of war. Additionally, 
regressions in table 2 are OLS estimations with fixed effects and a time trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 There is an important strand of the literature on optimal income taxation that relies on the level of this 
elasticity to find the optimal top tax. See Saez (2001) for a model that uses elasticities to derive optimal 
income tax rates. 
16
 On the effects of globalization on the shift of corporate profits and personal wealth to tax havens, see 
Zucman (2014). 
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Table 2: OLS estimations with interactions 
Dep. Variable: 
top 1% share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rel power -0.057 
(0.018)*** 
-0.057 
(0.017)*** 
-0.042 
(0.023)* 
-0.055 
(0.018)*** 
Top tax -0.491 
(0.098)*** 
-0.480 
(0.103)*** 
-0.516 
(0.102)*** 
-0.476 
(0.106)*** 
Union -0.167 
(0.088)* 
-0.167 
(0.089)* 
-0.143 
(0.090) 
-0.167 
(0.089)* 
Financial op 0.171 
(0.068)** 
0.166 
(0.071)** 
0.184 
(0.068)** 
0.167 
(0.071)** 
War risk 0.013 
(0.058) 
 -0.444 
(0.089)*** 
 
War effort  -0.887 
(0.325)** 
 -1.983 
(2.124) 
Rel power* War 
risk 
  -0.064 
(0.014)*** 
 
Rel power* War 
effort 
   -0.147 
(0.235) 
Obs 620 620 620 620 
Period range 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All specifications include county fixed effects and a time trend. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
In column (1), we reproduce table 1’s column (4) under an OLS estimation. 
Qualitatively, results do not change. Column (2) substitutes War risk by War effort. 
Under this specification, the coefficient on the threat of war is negative and significant. 
This is in line with the standard state capacity approach prediction. The effect of war 
should lead to the building of a society with a higher fiscal capacity and with more 
social cohesion, translated by smaller top income shares. As Rel power also measures 
this state capacity effect, it is interesting to understand how both variables interact.  
Columns (3) and (4) try to measure this effect. Under (3), we can see that the effect of 
War risk is more pronounced the higher Soviet Union’s relative power. In that sense, 
when a country was engaged in a war, the spectre of communism, possible associated 
with a defeat, became stronger. Although the Cold War did not imply a war between 
USA and USSR, there were a number of wars that had this conflict latent.  In column 
(4), the signal is the same, though results are no longer significant. Thus, results point to 
a varying effect of Rel power, but we cannot rely on its robustness. 
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VI – Robustness 
Until here, the analysis has relied on the period ranging from 1960 to 2010. 
Nevertheless, Soviet Union does not exist since 1991. Hence, the effects of the menace 
from a socialist geopolitical power should exist only until that year. Table 3, therefore, 
presents results segmenting sample in two subsamples: from 1960 to 1991 and from 
1992 to 2010. 
Table 3 
Dep. Variable: top 
1% share 
(1) - OLS (2) - TSLS (3) - OLS (4) - TSLS 
Rel power -0.045 
(0.028) 
-0.115 
(0.019)*** 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
Top tax -0.478 
(0.099)*** 
-0.423 
(0.049)*** 
-0.055 
(0.221) 
0.013 
(0.107) 
Union -0.299 
(0.127)** 
-0.311 
(0.052)*** 
-0.232 
(0.146) 
-0.218 
(0.098)** 
Financial op 0.129 
(0.075) 
0.177 
(0.035)*** 
0.135 
(0.057)** 
0.150 
(0.036)*** 
War risk 0.059 
(0.056) 
0.046 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.091) 
-0.034 
(0.036) 
Obs 352 330 268 254 
Period range 1970-1991 1970-1991 1992-2010 1992-2010 
R2 0.63 0.60 0.27 0.22 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  
All specifications include county fixed effects and a time trend. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
Results from table 3 show that the effects are, indeed, constrained in the period when 
Soviet Union existed. Although Russia inherited the vast majority of USSR’s nuclear 
weapons, the process of rapid transformation into a capitalist economy apparently drove 
down the effect of having a communist superpower on the other side of the fence.  
It is also worth noting what happens to top income tax rates’ effects. The elasticity 
vanishes in the second period. In a smaller magnitude, something similar applies to 
union density. On the other hand, the degree of financial openness remains positive and 
becomes, relatively, more important in the second period, exactly when globalization 
gained momentum.  
In addition, we use Rel Strengh, as defined in section 3, as another variable that proxies 
for the relative power. Again, as table 4 shows, results are statistically and economically 
significant. 
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Table 4 
Dep. Variable: top 
1% share 
(1) - OLS (2) - TSLS (3) - TSLS (4) - TSLS 
Rel strengh -0.185 
(0.033)*** 
-0.263 
(0.022)*** 
-0.244 
(0.047)*** 
0.083 
(0.141) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 740 694 440 254 
Period range 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-1991 1992-2010 
R2 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.001 
Prob>chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob>F 0.000    
All specifications include county fixed effects and a time trend. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
Another important aspect is that the utilization of fixed effects when the lagged 
dependent variable is a possible factor in the right-hand side of equation is not 
consistent. Usually, in cases like that, one uses GMM estimators. Nevertheless, Roine et 
al (2009) argue that with when there are many more years than countries, first 
differences estimators must be used. Thus, table 5 presents results with FD estimators. 
Table 5 – All variables are first differenced 
Dep. Variable: 
top 1% share 
(1) - OLS (2) - 
TSLS 
(3) - OLS (4) - 
TSLS 
(5) - OLS (6) - 
TSLS 
Rel power -0.017 
(0.008)** 
-0.021 
(0.008)** 
  
-0.018 
(0.008)** 
-0.022 
(0.008)*** 
Rel strengh   -0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.098 
(0.039)** 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged top 
share 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Obs 601 566 601 566 596 561 
Period range 1970-
2010 
1970-
2010 
1970-
2010 
1970-
2010 
1970-
2010 
1970-
2010 
R2 0.08 0.54 0.07 0.56 0.09 0.46 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  
All specifications include county fixed effects and a time trend. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
Again, results point to a robust relation between top incomes share and relative power 
of Soviet Union.  
VII – Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to discuss the role of the existence of a powerful socialist 
bloc as a disciplining device to inequality in western countries. The recent literature on 
top income inequality has emphasized explanations that go beyond the marginal 
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productivity framework to explain top incomes. Usually the literature points to domestic 
factors and, in some cases, to the role the two World Wars played in destroying capital, 
whether physical or financial, through inflation (Atkinson et al, 2011). Nevertheless, 
this literature does not embody the contributions of the State Capacity literature that 
assigns a role for wars in shaping state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2011). In this 
paper, we analyze the role of a latent conflict that has occurred from WWII to the 
eighties: the Cold War. We believe this lasting conflict helped to shape the creation of 
common-interest states, as Besley and Persson (2013) defined. Under these common-
interest states, a social cohesion emerged because of the presence of a powerful external 
enemy, leading to reduced top income shares.  
In order to test our hypothesis, we ran a panel of 18 OECD countries between 1960-
2010, controlling for variables that translate factor usually defined in the literature as 
important to explain top income inequality (Alvaredo et al, 2013). We find a robust and 
negative significant relation between Soviet Union’s relative military power and top 
income shares. 
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Figure A.1  
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Table A.2: First stage of table 1 
Dep. Variable: 
Rel poweri 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rel powerj 0.926 
(0.015)*** 
0.926 
(0.015)*** 
0.910 
(0.017)*** 
0.910 
(0.017)*** 
Top tax 0.253 
(0.063)*** 
0.285 
(0.064)*** 
0.297 
(0.069)*** 
0.297 
(0.069)*** 
Union  -0.057 
(0.043) 
-0.059 
(0.048) 
-0.060 
(0.048) 
Financial op   0.042 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.036) 
War risk    -0.0007 
(0.032) 
Constant 0.464 
(0.060)*** 
0.434 
(0.063)*** 
0.565 
(0.083)*** 
0.434 
(0.063)*** 
Obs 706 694 584 584 
Period range 1960-2010 1960-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
R2 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All specifications include county fixed effects and a time trend. Standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
 
 
